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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Welcome, everyone. My name is Sean Griffith. 
I am the T.J. Maloney Chair in Corporate Law and the Director of the 
Fordham Corporate Law Center. It is my job to welcome you here 
tonight and to give you a two-minute introduction to who we are and 
what we do, and then to welcome our speaker for the evening. We are 
the Fordham Corporate Law Center. I like to say that we are the think-
tank that Fordham has organized around corporate and securities law 
issues. We like to bring together three different types of audiences: we 
organize events for students to give them the opportunity to learn about 
different areas of business and corporate practice; we like to organize 
events for our scholars here at Fordham to bring together academics and 
policymakers on important research questions; and we like to bring 
together the public with high-profile public speakers on issues of great 
importance. I am happy to say that tonight we have managed to bring 
together all three of those groups for a very exciting lecture by 
Chancellor Bouchard. 
This is the Albert A. DeStefano Lecture. It is a lecture that was 
created in 2001 in honor of Albert A. DeStefano, a former partner at 
Becker & Ross who specialized in corporate matters, especially M&A. 
He was a Fordham alum and a Fordham adjunct professor from 1973 to 
1983. He has been deceased since 2012, but his daughter is now a 
practicing lawyer who practices corporate law in Delaware. Of our three 
lectures, the DeStefano Lecture has traditionally been our Delaware 
corporate law-focused lecture. Our fall lecture is the A.A. Sommer, Jr. 
Lecture, typically focused on securities law. In 2013, we had the 
pleasure of welcoming Vice Chancellor Laster to give the Albert A. 
DeStefano lecture; in 2014, former Chief Justice Steele gave the 
DeStefano lecture; and last year, we had a panel of eminent Delaware 
practitioners to discuss the issue of fee shifting with us, an important 
issue in Delaware corporate law. 
Tonight, we have the Chancellor himself. I am pleased to introduce 
the Honorable Andre G. Bouchard, who was sworn in as Chancellor of 
the Court of Chancery on May 5, 2014. Before his appointment, 
Chancellor Bouchard spent twenty-eight years in private practice in 
Wilmington, Delaware, including as the managing partner of Bouchard 
Margules & Friedlander, Professional Association, a corporate and 
commercial litigation boutique that he founded. Before starting his own 
firm, Chancellor Bouchard served as a litigator at Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
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Meagher & Flom. Chancellor Bouchard received his law degree from 
Harvard Law School in 1986 and a bachelor’s, summa cum laude, from 
Boston College in 1983, where he was the recipient of the Edward H. 
Finnegan Award. He was selected as a Harry S. Truman Scholar from 
Delaware in 1981, and he has been a past Chairman of the Judicial 
Nominating Commission, a Fellow of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers, and a member of The American Law Institute. 
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LECTURE 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: Thank you for having me tonight. 
And thank you, Sean, for the very nice introduction. I never knew I 
would get a hundred people in a room to talk about disclosure 
settlements. That is a big surprise to me. As Sean said, I have been the 
Chancellor now for just about two years. I became Chancellor on May 5, 
2014. I will start by saying that it is very different than being somebody 
who runs for political office. When you run for political office, you have 
an agenda you define to do something proactive. Being a judge is very 
reactive. You do not know what issues you are going to have, you do not 
know what kind of cases you are going to get. It is just random, 
whatever hits the lot. 
Notwithstanding that fact, every once in a while some case comes 
along that gives you the chance to do something more proactive, 
something more prescriptive, something that can actually change the 
direction of the law, or the direction of practice. For me—we will see if 
history shows this to be true—Trulia1 was that opportunity to do 
something more policy-oriented, to do something that maybe could 
change the way that business was being conducted before in the area of 
disclosure settlements. 
I know we have a bit of a diverse group, so I have prepared some 
slides that are going to go through the anatomy of the Trulia decision: 
what came before it, in terms of the dynamics, what the decision was 
trying to achieve, and the paradigm it laid out. 
There will be roughly four parts to this: I will start out with some 
statistics to show you the magnitude of this issue because it really is an 
issue of rather significant importance that affects corporate litigation. I 
will then talk about some of the dynamics that fuel different motivations 
in the process. Thirdly, from a pre-Trulia, traditional perspective, I will 
look at how we had been doing business in the past and, in particular, 
some of the challenges of being a judge and reviewing cases and the 
circumstances that they presented, as well as some of the criticisms that 
process engendered. Then lastly, the fourth point I want to cover is 
Trulia itself: what the case was about, the nuts and bolts of it, and then, 
to the extent I could be so bold as to say, the paradigm that I tried to lay 
out to, hopefully, improve or in some incremental way help the law 
evolve to be a better way of dealing with these kinds of issues. 
                                                
 1. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
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Some basic statistics—and I have a slide for this: 
 
Figure 1: Deal Litigation Slipping from Peak2 
 
The two most significant numbers on this page, to me, are the first 
number on the orange line and the last number on that line.3 What is the 
orange line? The orange line is the percentages of deals that result in 
litigation. To give you an idea, this is not a small sample size. Every one 
of these boxes represents over a hundred cases, with the exception of 
two years where there were about seventy-five cases. Some of these 
involve 200 cases. And we are talking about cases involving public 
companies, a deal over a $100 million, and there were some other 
metrics. These data were collected by an SEC economist and Steven 
Davidoff (who is now at Berkeley), and they are published every year. 
Why do I say this orange line and those two particular data points 
are significant? It is because just about ten years ago, in 2006, 39% of 
those deals were litigated, but by the time you get to 2014, the number 
rises to 95%.4 That is more than double in the span of just ten years. If 
you went back in time, for which I do not have the data here, I would 
                                                
 2. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715890 [https://perma.cc/Y5JD-  
22BY]. 
 3. See supra Figure 1, square plot points for years 2005 and 2014. 
 4. Cain & Solomon, supra note 2; see supra Figure 1. 
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wager to say it would show around 20% of those deals being litigated. 
Now, how many of those result in disclosure-only settlements? 
Let me define what I view as a disclosure-only settlement. It is one 
of these M&A cases that is filed alleging that a target board breached its 
fiduciary duty, usually for selling the company for too cheap. That is the 
core allegation. It is settled on the basis of the consideration that, “We 
are going to give you additional information to include in the proxy 
statement that goes to the target shareholders to approve the deal.” What 
is the value of that? The value of that, presumably, is that if you have 
better qualitative information, you have a more informed franchise, and 
that has a corporate benefit associated with it. 
What the blue line shows, by the way, are the cases that settled in 
the same time period just for disclosures, i.e., there is no money going to 
the stockholders. These are just disclosures, or in some cases, a tweak to 
a deal, a protection measure, or something of that nature in the merger 
agreement. The numbers there are also very significant. In recent years, 
about 80% of these cases are settling just for disclosures. So why is this 
happening? Follow the money. It is a very good business for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to be in. 
 
Figure 2: Median Attorneys’ Fees in Delaware Settlements5 
 
Now, the data here is a little skewed, but let me give you the 
perspective. First of all, it is a median and this is just Delaware now. 
                                                
 5. Cain & Solomon, supra note 2. 
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The prior data I showed you was national. But most of these cases come 
to Delaware, although the numbers vary from year to year. These are the 
fee awards in Delaware. Now, admittedly, because they are not just the 
disclosure-fee awards and also include other kinds of cases, it is not a 
perfect proxy. But what you essentially find during this time period is 
that, on average, in disclosure-only settlements, plaintiffs’ lawyers were 
receiving fees roughly between $300,000 on the low side to $500,000–
$600,000 for a case.6 
Some people may say, “Well, that does not sound like a lot of 
money in the grand scheme of things.” But, for the lawyers doing a lot 
of these cases it is an inventory business. They would have ten, fifteen, 
twenty of these cases in a year, potentially. That can run a good, small 
firm. So, the question becomes, “Does it make any sense that we have 
gone from the point where essentially every deal is resulting in a lawsuit 
and every deal is resulting in disclosure-only settlements? Is that really 
productive or socially useful?” That is the whole point of this exercise, 
in terms of where the law was and where Trulia, hopefully, may have 
some value in changing things. 
Let me start talking about some of the dynamics that surround this 
settlement process. There is a quote from 1995, from a former 
Chancellor named Bill Allen. I quoted this in the Trulia decision. I also 
use it because it is the source of this “peppercorn” statement that keeps 
coming up in the context of discussing disclosure-only settlements. 
What he says is, “It is a fact evident to all of those who are familiar with 
shareholder litigation that surviving a motion to dismiss means, as a 
practical matter, that economical[ly] rational defendants (who are 
usually not apt to be repeat players in these kinds of cases) will settle 
such claims, often for a peppercorn and a fee.”7 
The point is that there is leverage in litigation. If you can get by a 
motion to dismiss—this was not a disclosure-only settlement; it was a 
motion to dismiss—you have a chip in your pocket. You know you can 
impose a lot of cost on the other side to go through the process, and so, 
you have leverage to do a deal. Indeed, there is a lot of leverage on both 
sides of these deals. 
                                                
 6. Cain & Solomon, supra note 2. 
 7. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(quoting Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1995), aff’d, 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996)). 
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This may be the most useful slide in the whole deck, in terms of 
laying out in one page people’s motivation surrounding these deals.8 
What happens? The deal is announced, and the complaint gets filed 
immediately after the deal is announced—and I mean immediately; 
sometimes these complaints are filed within minutes of deal 
announcements—and usually there are several iterations of them. 
Eventually, they get consolidated. The litigation gets going. 
What do people fight about? First and foremost, it is about 
disclosures, which are in the proxy that goes to the target stockholders. 
Approximately 80%—and actually probably higher than 80%—of the 
complaints focus on that, and sometimes on some additional issues. The 
second most common thing they focus on is some grievance with the 
deal-protection measures in the merger agreement. What am I talking 
about? 
 Break-up fees: if the transaction does not go forward, then the 
target company gets a payment from the proposed acquirer. There can 
be reverse break-ups, but straight break-up fees are usually the focus. 
 No-shop clauses, which limit the ability of a target company to 
communicate with other potential bidders. 
 Matching rights. 
All of these have been litigated for three decades now in Delaware, all 
of these have lots of case law behind them, and people should know the 
rules of the road; and yet, they are still thrown into many complaints. 
Those first two bullets cover probably 95% of what people litigate or try 
to litigate in corporate M&A litigation. The stuff that really matters is in 
the third bullet, but there are very few times it forms the basis of a real, 
meaningful challenge. 
What is the third bullet? It would be when you have a situation 
where there is an unfair process, such as a process corrupted by some 
self-interest. Revlon9 is classic example involving a multiple-bidder 
situation where there was favoritism towards one bidder over another. It 
could be because management is partial to one bidder versus another for 
their own self-interest and they want to work with the acquirer to 
maintain a continuing equity interest, or to cut some sort of side deal, or 
                                                
 8. Andre G. Bouchard, Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery, PowerPoint 
presentation for the Sixteenth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities & Financial Law (Apr. 11, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Journal of 
Corporate and Financial Law). 
 9. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
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something of that nature. That is where the real action is, and those are 
the cases that are worthy of litigating. But that is not where most of the 
activity actually occurs. It mostly occurs in the disclosure context and in 
the deal-protection context to a lesser extent. 
What happens after a case is filed? The first thing that happens is 
the plaintiffs move to expedite the case or both parties agree to expedite 
it themselves. A key thing here is that the standard to expedite is a pretty 
low standard. It is colorability. Basically, you need to have something 
that is not a frivolous claim. It is a plaintiff-friendly standard 
deliberately because you are very early in a case, and so, you are giving 
it a quick look. Typically, you are not going to put the stop on things 
immediately, so you give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, more or 
less, at the beginning of the case. That is leverage because if you can 
expedite, then expense comes into play on the defense side: they have to 
defend the case, and that is enormous leverage for the plaintiff. 
The other thing that favors the plaintiffs is that the law favors 
getting disclosure issues sorted out pre-vote. Why? Because when you 
vote, you would like to have all the information that is relevant and 
material, and the easiest way to correct not having it is to go through an 
injunctive process to force that the information be disseminated in 
advance, rather than deal with it on the back end. 
So, the plaintiffs have a lot of leverage going into this. They know 
it is a pretty low standard on the merits to obtain expedition so they 
know they can likely get the case expedited. But then there is also self-
interest on the defense side. The defendants have liked this business too 
because there is the opportunity, potentially, of getting an early global 
release, a very broad release. I will go through an example of how broad 
these releases can be. And because they like that, they often agree to 
stipulate, “Oh, we will just expedite. No need to file a motion to 
expedite. No need to go to court and ask permission to expedite. We will 
just agree to expedite.” 
What form does that take? They will offer to produce the core 
documents in the case voluntarily. They will arrange a few depositions. 
You are usually talking about board books, minutes, maybe some 
emails—maybe not emails, which are the killer in almost every case, so 
it is a huge issue how many emails you get in the front end of the case. 
They may make a director available for a deposition, or maybe a banker. 
They will typically agree to some sort of limited discovery. 
Then, in this magic moment that occurs after people have 
skirmished around, all of a sudden they come to an agreement. They 
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say, “Okay, we will supplement our proxy with XYZ materials. In 
exchange, you give us a global release and you can apply for a fee.” 
That is really the playbook, and that is what has been going on, with 
increasing frequency, for a good number of years now. 
Now why, by the way, do the defendants want to do this in addition 
to getting a release? Well, legitimately, they want to avoid the 
distraction and the expense of what they think is nuisance litigation, and 
obviously, they do not want to imperil their deal. By settling, they will 
be able to get closing certainty. 
I am going to walk through some nuts and bolts of what we do 
when we are considering approving a settlement. After an agreement is 
reached—and it is typically documented initially in a memorandum of 
understanding (an “MoU”)—the defendants will provide the 
supplemental disclosures. They usually fall in one of three categories: 
first, more information about the background of the transaction; second, 
more information about the description of the financial advisors’ work 
to the target board, which is what Trulia dealt with substantively; or 
third, more information that sheds light on a conflict associated with the 
deal. 
A big issue is banker conflicts. Did the bankers who were advising 
the target also advise somebody on the sell side; did the banker have an 
interest in staple financing? Were there issues surrounding potential 
conflicts with the advisors to the board? Also, big fodder for conflict 
disclosure would be any undisclosed continuing interest of management 
in the acquiring company, whether by way of employment 
arrangements, or by way of a continuing equity interest, for example. 
These are things that all good securities lawyers know how to disclose in 
the first place. But, believe it or not, they have come up and they have 
resulted in some meaningful cases. Del Monte10 would be a classic 
example. So, there is the agreement: you define the universe of 
supplemental disclosures the target is going to make, the stockholders 
approve the deal, and the deal closes. 
Now, long after the fact—usually it is months, sometimes it is even 
over a year; I now have cases that are a year and a half post-close that 
are still in the pipeline for court consideration—the parties will present 
their settlement for court approval. What happens in the interim? The 
parties prepare formal settlement papers. The company sends out a 
notice to the class disclosing the settlement terms. Stockholders are 
                                                
 10. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
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given an opportunity to object but it is utilized rather infrequently, and it 
is an imperfect mechanism for various reasons. At that point, the court 
has to decide, in a class context, three things: 
 Is the settlement fair? 
 Should the class be certified and should the settlement bind the 
class, which go hand in hand? 
 Thirdly, what should the plaintiffs get paid? If the settlement 
was fair, there must have been a benefit conferred to the stockholders as 
consideration for the deal, so the plaintiffs would be entitled to some 
fee. And then the question is, “What is the magnitude of that?” 
That is the basic settlement process. 
There are some legal principles that apply to this. This is from the 
perspective of pre-Trulia. It has evolved a little bit. The first couple of 
things are basic points. The law favors the settlement of cases. Certainly, 
that is non-controversial. The second is: what is the standard that we 
apply in considering whether to approve a settlement? It ultimately boils 
down to fairness and reasonableness, which are broad terms that give 
lots of latitude and lots of discretion. Fundamentally, it boils down to: 
what is the give and the get? From the perspective of shareholders, what 
do they give up and what do they get in exchange for releasing their 
claims? 
Now, focusing more on disclosures: what is the standard that 
governs what information must be disclosed in a proxy statement? 
Delaware law follows the federal standard, and it comes from 
TSC/Northway: “An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote.”11 This standard affords incredible discretion in 
deciding what is material or not material. It is not so easy when you 
actually get into the weeds of it. 
Pre-Trulia, the court historically had been very accommodating to 
allow these settlements to be approved even when disclosures were not 
necessarily material in the legal sense of the term, i.e., they often were 
permitted when a disclosure might just be helpful, useful, of some value, 
marginally helpful—lots of very slippery terms. 
Why was that happening? Some of these policies that we have 
talked about favor settlements. The parties worked to put a deal 
together. Courts do not generally like to jump in and reject settlements 
out of hand. There is a lot of momentum behind a settlement. But the 
                                                
 11. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976). 
12 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
other reason is that if you were rigorous in saying you had to make a 
finding that something is material—and this is going to come back when 
we talk about Trulia at the end of this—you are in a dangerous position 
of setting a precedent where everybody thinks, “The minute you call 
something ‘material,’ you have to put it in every proxy statement for the 
rest of time.” 
For example, if I said, “Oh, it was material in this circumstance and 
it supports this particular settlement that you disclosed the EBITDA 
multiples of the seven other transactions that you looked at in a 
comparable companies analysis or in a selected transaction analysis,” 
then that transcript—or if it was an opinion, but more often a 
transcript—is going to be quoted back in the next deal saying, “Oh this 
is material. You have got to have it in there.” It is not quite that simple 
but that is one of the problems. 
It is easier, therefore, to slip in looser language so you are not 
setting those precedents casually in the context of ruling on a settlement. 
It is easier to say, “Well, it is somewhat helpful.” But you would prefer 
not to bite hard and say, “Oh no, this is material.” That aspect was 
fueling more accommodation to let these settlements go through on a 
regular basis. 
The “give”: this is now from the perspective of the shareholder in 
terms of the “give.” The stockholders as a class release not just the 
directors but also the bankers, the attorneys, the proxy advisers—
anybody who had anything to do with the defense side of the deal. The 
language of that release is extremely broad. They will also include 
typically—and I cannot remember a release that did not—all federal 
claims associated with the transaction that somebody in the class would 
have the ability to bring. 
The release would even include, though it may surprise some 
people, federal claims that I would not even have jurisdiction over in my 
court in the first place, things that are exclusively within the jurisdiction 
of a federal court, such as certain securities claims. But it has been 
upheld that those claims can be within the ambit of this kind of release, 
and the Matsushita case stands for that.12 It will also include the 
unknown unknowns: claims you do not even know about. 
This example of a release is condensed.13 This is probably a 
paragraph that was about a page long, and it gives you the heart of the 
                                                
 12. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386 (1996). 
 13. Bouchard, supra note 8. 
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release that is in the settlement document. Everyone in the class, 
everybody who owns stock as of a certain date or during some defined 
period releases any claims because it says “known or unknown.”14 And 
then, a little later on, it has a defined term “unknown claims”15—which 
by the way, when you go to it, is another page that defines unknown 
claims. Because the release did not cover it well enough the first time, it 
says “unknown known,” now we have to have another definition to 
cover that. And it includes federal, state, foreign, statutory, and 
regulatory claims, etc. 
Now, you obviously have to have a private right of action or 
nobody in the class could bring those types of claims in the first place. 
You cannot forbid the government from doing whatever it wants to do. 
But the release is very broad. It could include antitrust claims. It is 
extremely rare that somebody will have done any inquiry in the context 
of a fiduciary duty case to probe the merits of a private right of action 
under the Sherman Act or under the Clayton Act or anything of that 
nature. It has happened, but it is extremely rare. What is the problem 
with such a broad release? The problem is, you can give up good claims. 
I am going to give you two examples which my firm was involved 
in before I went on the bench, at least with Rural/Metro16 to the point of 
the liability judgment, and then there were some other later proceedings 
in it. These are two examples of cases that were proposed as disclosure 
settlements. For example, in the Prime Hospitality17 case, for a $325,000 
fee, a very broad release was going to be approved that would have cut 
off claims. My firm objected. It is rare that it happens, but we did. 
One of the problems with the objection process is you need 
somebody who is willing to step in and take control of the case. If you 
do not have that, as a judge, you are not likely to blow up the settlement 
and make the plaintiff’s lawyer—who is ready to settle the case—
continue. It has happened. It is much better if you have an objector, 
somebody who wants to come in and take over the case. In Prime 
Hospitality, the case was going to settle for disclosures and a fee award 
of $325,000. We ran the case for a year and a half, and did some 
                                                
 14. Stipulation & Agreement of Compromise, Settlement & Release, 
Assad v. World Energy Sols., Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2015). 
 15. Id. 
 16. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 875 (Del. 2015). 
 17. In re Prime Hosp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 652-N, 2005 WL 1138738 (Del. Ch. May 
4, 2005). 
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discovery. The case later settled for $25 million, generating real money 
for the stockholders. 
A much more celebrated case in this regard is the Rural/Metro18 
case. It fundamentally concerned aiding and abetting liability against a 
financial advisor. In that case, it was RBC Capital. In 2012, Vice 
Chancellor Laster, in what he called a “very close call,” blew up a 
proposed disclosure settlement—again, our firm was coming in to 
represent the plaintiffs—where the fee requested was $475,000, and an 
extremely broad release was proposed. 
Two or three years and a lot of litigation activity later, net–net, after 
some interim settlements with certain defendants and ultimately a trial 
against RBC, well over $100 million dollars in consideration went to the 
stockholders. This was not inconsequential. A hundred million dollars 
does not sound like much if the deal was $50 billion, but $100 million 
for this case was about 22% of the deal value. It was in the magnitude of 
the recent Dole19 judgment that was entered, which was in the same 
ballpark. 
So, these cases show the need for concern. If you do not litigate, 
what do stockholders get in a disclosure settlement? This is a case I had. 
I am going to show you two slides. I am going to show you one that 
gives you an example of useful information, meaningful information—I 
would even bite the bullet and say “material” information. The other one 
that I will show you in the next slide from the same case was 
meaningless information from my perspective. 
This is from the case called Assad v. World Energy Solutions.20 I 
think it was about a $100 million deal. It was not a very big deal. This is 
a picture of part of the summary of the financial advisor to the target’s 
presentation: 
                                                
 18. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC, 129 A.3d 816. 
 19. In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 8703-VCL, 2015 WL 
5052214 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). 
 20. Assad v. World Energy Sols., Inc., No. 10324-CB, 2015 WL 4977604 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 20, 2015). 
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Figure 3: Free Cash Flow Calculation21 
 
Keep in mind that when you start, before you receive supplemental 
disclosures, you already have ten or twelve single-spaced pages 
summarizing a banker’s analysis, and you are typically summarizing a 
DCF (discounted cash flow) model that the banker put together; a 
comparable companies analysis, if they did one; and analyses of 
multiples from other deals that the advisor extrapolates and compares to 
the deal that is on the table. 
This is the set of management projections, which are the inputs to 
do a DCF model. Curiously, in this case what is in the red box is the 
additive information. Duff & Phelps was the financial advisor in this 
case. The projection that was disclosed initially ran through 2020, and 
what was added was three more years to that projection. 
Why was that significant? It was significant because the way you 
do a DCF is you need the free cash flow numbers. In order to do a 
terminal value, to extrapolate the perpetual value after a discrete period, 
you need the last year of the projection. For whatever reason, even 
though Duff & Phelps did a terminal value calculation based on 2023 in 
the full projection, they only disclosed the projections out to 2020. 
There is good law in Delaware, including the Netsmart22 case that 
then-Chancellor Strine—now our Chief Justice—wrote, that this is 
typically material information—not always, but typically, material 
                                                
 21. World Energy Sols., Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule 
14D-9) (Dec. 24, 2014). 
 22. See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 199–200 (Del. 
Ch. 2007). 
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information. This would be an example of something that was 
meaningfully additive. Indeed, I approved this settlement and awarded 
the fee primarily because of this disclosure. 
What would be less meaningful information? This is the part of the 
summary of the M&A transaction analysis that Duff & Phelps did: 
 
Figure 4: Selected M&A Transactions Analysis23 
 
What this is doing is comparing a multiple—in this case, I think it 
is an enterprise value to EBITDA multiple—of different deals to the 
enterprise to EBITDA multiple of the company at issue here, which was 
World Energy, the target. Why do I think this information had little or 
no value? First of all, almost all of this information is publicly available 
for anybody who wants to go out and find it. 
Now you could say, “Well it is helpful because they put it in a nice 
spot for you,” and that is true to some extent. But it is also much less 
meaningful because they have already disclosed, in my view, what 
really matters: they disclosed the banker’s judgment about the range of 
the multiples. For example, already disclosed in this proxy statement 
was the fact that the highest EBITDA multiple is 20.9 and that the 
lowest was 5.8 and that the banker when it did its analysis made a 
judgment to pick a multiple within that range. Everything else, I think 
you could say, is more marginal in value. 
                                                
 23. World Energy Sols., Inc., supra note 21. 
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This stuff is truly in the weeds. And one of the big problems with 
disclosure settlements is that judges, without having adversaries 
presenting both sides of these issues, have to go figure this out 
themselves, unless you get the rare objector. Before this hearing, I am 
poring over this proxy and I am trying to figure out if someone is selling 
me a bill of goods; did this information really have any value? 
I am poring through proxy details like this to assess whether the 
supplemental disclosures were truly meritorious. I have three of my law 
clerks here, who have done this exercise with me, where you walk 
through the proxy statement. Nobody is doing it for you on the other 
side, so you have got to figure it out yourself. This is what I called in 
Trulia the exercise of being, essentially, a forensic examiner of the 
proxy statement—not what judges do well. 
That segues naturally into the challenges of reviewing the record as 
a judge. The first challenge is: typically, you have not really thought 
about the case very much. You likely have not decided a motion to 
dismiss. You have not decided summary judgment. Often, there is not a 
motion to expedite because the litigants can expedite the cases 
themselves. Typically, there is very little discovery: maybe three 
depositions, maybe one or two before an agreement on a tentative basis 
or an MoU is reached, and one or two later when it is confirmatory. In 
terms of documents, maybe the banker books have been produced; 
maybe the minutes; it is questionable how much email; and, if you really 
do get into those confirmatory depositions, it is a pretty light touch. It is 
this lack of an adversarial process that was so much a part of why I 
thought things had to change. The judges were being asked, essentially, 
to be the check without anything being disputed. 
Every other issue we get, both sides, plaintiff and defendant, have 
presented and the judge is supposed to call the balls and strikes, as Chief 
Justice Roberts said.24 It works a little differently for the Supreme Court 
but it truly works in the state court system. As a state court trial judge, 
you are largely making calls of balls and strikes. But somebody 
packages it for you; you do not have to go figure it out for yourself, and 
that is a real problem when you have to do it yourself because you can 
get it wrong. The adversary system works well because the smart people 
on both sides tee up the issue. 
                                                
 24. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
56 (2005) (statement of Chief Justice Roberts). 
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Here is another problem. This is not my phraseology on the bottom 
here.25 I stole this from my former partner—Tier I versus Tier II 
advocacy—to refer to the fact that there are some really good plaintiffs’ 
firms out there who dig deep, take these cases seriously, litigate hard, 
and they get good results. And then there is sort of inventory 
management in the plaintiff industry where the approach involves 
working the docket and making the money on the volume and not 
necessarily on the home runs or the triples. 
As you might imagine, this whole process engendered a lot of 
criticism by academics and others. Professor Griffith and some of his 
academic colleagues—this goes back to the “peppercorn” reference in 
the Solomon case I referred to before—did an article last year. They did 
an analysis saying that the information provided to the stockholders, the 
supplemental disclosures, had no meaningful effect on the outcome of 
stockholder voting on deals.26 Ipso facto, that means the supplemental 
information was not material; it did not move the needle. That article got 
a lot of attention, a lot of currency. 
Second, as you might imagine, there has been a great deal of 
criticism that this industry was just imposing rents or taxes on deals. 
There are two types of taxes. One type is the payment of the fee itself to 
the plaintiffs, if it is not merited; it is about $300,000–$500,000. There 
have been some that, in the heyday, run around $750,000 pretty 
regularly. The other tax is on the defense side: the cost of defending the 
cases. The minute they get filed, I would venture to guess, on average, 
those defense costs, especially if you have had multiple representation 
situations, are more significant than the fee award. 
Third, there is the problem I have already identified before with 
Rural/Metro and Prime Hospitality: the risk that you could lose 
meaningful claims. Frankly, do they happen that often? No. But they do, 
and they are there, and you can have them cut off from the beginning 
without any real rigorous scrutiny. 
Fourth, I do not know if this is true or not, but I have been told that 
given this incentive structure and how this works, could it be that some 
corporate lawyers actually hold back on what they disclose and just have 
an extra chip in their pocket to settle a case? It is a little curious why that 
                                                
 25. Bouchard, supra note 8. 
 26. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the 
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for 
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015). 
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projection in the World Energy case cut off in 2020 when Duff & Phelps 
went to 2023 in its analysis. I have no idea; I am totally speculating 
there. But the point is, it certainly would not be good practice if that was 
occurring. There have been rumors to that effect but nothing empirical I 
am aware of. 
The other criticism is that objecting—which is supposed to be a 
failsafe to having a good process, by letting somebody step forward and 
saying “it is a rotten deal” or “the fee is unfair” or whatever it may be—
is really of limited value. It is of limited value because very few people 
take the time to do it, or make the effort to do it. More importantly, it is 
one thing to just throw stones at something; it is another thing when an 
objector steps forward and is actually willing to take over the case. That 
is a whole different ballgame. 
How did we deal with this problem initially? There were two things 
that were occurring before the ultimate precipitating factor to the Trulia 
decision itself. The first thing that was happening was, notwithstanding 
how plaintiff-friendly the standard is at the motion-to-expedite phase—I 
mentioned colorability, a sort of non-frivolous standard—there was 
more rigor applied within that standard not to expedite some cases. The 
minute you do not expedite a case, the pressure point of a preliminary 
injunction before a deal usually comes off. 
Now, it once was a dirty little secret—not so much a secret since 
the El Paso27 and Delphi28 cases a few years ago—that, as a practical 
matter, you were not likely to get an injunction for a Revlon29 case, a 
sale of control of the company case, if there was only one bidder for the 
company in the first place. Disclosures on their own, if they are 
something truly material, could separately be a basis for a showing of 
irreparable harm and, therefore, an injunction. But it is a limited 
injunction. Putting disclosures aside, deals typically would not be 
enjoined if you had only one bidder in the case. Why? Because a court is 
going to be very reluctant to play with the shareholders’ money, and 
usually will let them make the decision for themselves about whether to 
approve a deal. Plus, what plaintiff is going to realistically post a bond 
to cover an injunction? 
                                                
 27. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 28. In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 
729232 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 29. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 
1986). 
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That was sort of what “everybody knew in the business,” as I am 
sure many of the practitioners in the room know, for a good period of 
time, the practical reality of most of these cases—again putting the 
disclosure part aside. But it was stated explicitly in the El Paso case, 
when then-Chancellor Strine, in the context of balancing the hardships 
or weighing the equities of the case, stated it outright. He was not going 
to deprive the El Paso shareholders of the opportunity to accept the deal, 
even though he had concerns about the deal. He thought there might be 
some conflict issues in that deal, but he was not going to enter the 
injunction. Instead, he would let the shareholders decide if they wanted 
to take a premium transaction or not.30 
So, the first approach was, “Okay, let us deny expedition and try to 
take the pressure off of the process and make it go on a normal litigation 
track.” The second way these cases were dealt with was to reduce the 
fee and to cut off, from at least one side of the equation, the incentive, 
the money, the lucre. The concept started becoming: “Well, we will 
have fees that are proportional to what you really provided, and if it was 
marginal disclosure, the fee would be less.” 
But the problem with that, the biggest problem with that, is that the 
releases still remain and they are still excruciatingly broad. 
Notwithstanding some fee reduction that you would probably see if the 
empirical data were done, it sloped down from the $500,000–$600,000 
range, I would say, in the 2006 to 2007 period, to more of in the 
$300,000 range, roughly.31 But notwithstanding that, the volume would 
keep coming, and indeed it has been coming. 
What is the third option? The third option finally started happening, 
and that was to just reject the settlements. Just say, “Enough is enough. 
What you produced is not worthy of giving the release of the breadth 
that you are seeking.” Probably the most vocal proponent of doing 
that—Vice Chancellor Strine did it once—was Vice Chancellor Laster, 
who did a series of them in 2015, the most celebrated one being the 
Aeroflex32 decision where he rejected a proposed settlement and said he 
would give the parties options. The defense could come back and move 
to dismiss. Now remember, Revlon at this point—some people here 
                                                
 30. In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., 2012 WL 729232, at *19 (citing In re El 
Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012)). 
 31. Cain & Solomon, supra note 2; supra Figure 2. 
 32. Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 7069591 (Del. 
Ch. July 8, 2015). 
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litigated Revlon—was thirty years old. There is a lot of case law 
describing how Revlon is supposed to work and what really matters. So, 
there is a lot of precedent here. This was not new business, so people 
could file motions to dismiss and there was a good body of precedent to 
facilitate those motions. In the post-Corwin33 world where there is now 
precedent that if you get the vote to approve the deal and it is a fully 
informed vote—ergo, the disclosure issue is still in play—the standard 
would revert to the business judgment rule, even if it was initially a 
Revlon case. 
The other option was for the parties to narrow the release and the 
court would reconsider the settlement or the parties could just moot it.34 
You will see that these are all early strains of what becomes part of 
Trulia. This happened a number of times in 2015 and led up to where 
we are now with the Trulia decision itself. 
What was Trulia? Trulia was about two online real estate firms that 
combined. It was a $3.5 billion deal. An interesting fact lost in 
everything is it was a stock-for-stock merger, which meant that Revlon 
was not likely to be triggered. It was presumptively a business judgment 
rule case from the outset, which is a very tough case for a plaintiff to 
bring from the outset. At least in Revlon, there was intermediate 
reasonableness review for the plaintiff to start with. But this was 
presumptively going to be a business judgment case. 
What was the fight about? The fight was about the exchange ratio: 
how much stock the target shareholders would receive in the combined 
entity. In this case, right to the playbook of what I have already covered, 
I never got the chance to rule on a motion to expedite. The parties 
agreed to do it themselves. There was a motion for expedition filed, and 
I think within two hours there was a stipulation for a schedule to 
proceed with expedited discovery, and then promptly thereafter there 
was an agreement on supplemental disclosures. 
Classic example: very limited record, two depositions before a 
memorandum of understanding was reached and one deposition after, 
about 3000 pages of documents produced, the vast majority of which 
were copies of the banker’s books, some SEC disclosure documents, and 
minutes, and then the deal closes. The plaintiffs come in after the fact 
and they ask for $375,000 in fees. That was in the ballpark of the range 
for this type of fee award at that point. 
                                                
 33. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 34. Aeroflex Holding Corp., 2015 WL 7069591. 
22 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
This slide35 shows the true holding of Trulia. This is what was in 
this settlement that was useful. There are only two things about this 
slide36 that are interesting to me. The first one on the top is a synergy 
estimate for a value creation analysis. What this was about was there 
was an analysis comparing the value of the target, Trulia, on a 
standalone basis to the pro forma value of the combined entity. To do 
that analysis you needed to input into the model this value creation 
analysis, the expected synergies of the deal. 
The plaintiffs were so happy. They said, “We got this supplemental 
disclosure of how much the synergies are worth in this deal. Now you 
can understand this analysis.” My law clerk and I sat down and read 
through this proxy statement, and I said, “The disclosure they said was 
so valuable was already in the proxy statement; it was just three pages 
ahead in a part that described the actual synergies.” That was a 
revelation, by the way, to the plaintiff’s lawyer who was presenting the 
case at argument when I pointed out that this information already was in 
the proxy statement. He was a little embarrassed about that. 
Then all of sudden—I often do the same thing when I have one of 
these cases—I typically ask, “Well give me your best two or best three,” 
and he led with this as his first. I said, “This is too good to be true.” So 
he laid it out. I said, “Was that not already in here?” and I showed him 
the page. He said, “I have got another better one,” and he went right to 
his second one. His other “better one” were these two, two and three on 
the slide,37 and, frankly, most of that was information for comparables 
that were available from other sources somewhere in the public domain. 
The key thing about these comparable analyses is you already start 
with a proxy statement that has ten or fifteen pages summarizing this, 
and it is a summary; you are not required to disclose every detail in the 
world. But in discovery, somebody gets a banker’s book and you can 
always find something in there that is not in the proxy. If you have been 
to law school and you have a degree and you are good on your feet, you 
can always say, “It is more information.” It is easy to sound persuasive 
by saying “more information is better,” when it is often just clutter, in 
                                                
 35. Bouchard, supra note 8 (listing the supplemental disclosures found to be useful 
in Trulia). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Bouchard, supra note 8 (listing “Comparable transaction multiples” and 
“Comparable company trading multiples” as disclosures). 
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terms of describing and summarizing fairly what the financial advisors’ 
advice was based on. 
I did reject the Trulia proposed settlement. I found that the fair 
summary did not mean you have to give every little piece of minutia you 
can ever imagine. I thought that not only were the financial disclosures 
not material, they were not even helpful to the stockholders. In fact, I 
thought they were counterproductive in many cases, and, based on that, 
there was so little on the “get” for the stockholders that the “give” of the 
release was not appropriate. 
That is the real holding of Trulia. But I did something a little 
different in Trulia that I have not had a chance to do in too many cases. I 
tried to lay out a different way to go or a different approach to looking at 
these cases. This is the prescriptive aspect of the work I did. This was 
evolutionary. Sean participated in some of this. I had been dealing with 
seven or eight of these cases by this point. I had a pretty good idea of the 
rules of the road. Obviously, I had practiced in this area for a long time 
beforehand; the Chief Justice had me up at Harvard and I used an early 
form of these slides for a class of his, and we had a program at Penn that 
Sean participated in. This all started coming in my head: “There has got 
to be a different approach here. We are going to have to evolve from the 
way we have been doing this.” 
I tried to sketch out a paradigm of what I thought was the better 
way to do it. Basically, the preferred way is to maintain the adversarial 
process. Judges need people on both sides of an issue so it can be teed 
up and they can be the umpire calling the balls and strikes. They should 
not be out there figuring it out for themselves. That is not good for the 
process. We can certainly get it wrong if we are left to our own devices. 
So, we need people to tee it up and have adversity, such that both sides 
are presenting. 
There are two ways you do it. One is you actually litigate the 
disclosure issues, and the other is you moot them out. Then, when you 
have the release out of the equation, you still have adversity over the 
quality of the supplemental information that was disclosed and, for that 
matter, over the appropriateness of a fee. That is the core concept. 
And then, the less desirable way: if you are going to still go the 
traditional settlement route, the rules are going to be tougher. They are 
going to be tougher in the sense that what you give up, the release, is 
going to have to be much more tailored, and what you get is going to 
have to be something that is “plainly material.” I will talk about that in a 
second. 
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Before I expand on those options, there is a caveat to all of this. 
This is the concern I have, and I stated it expressly in Trulia, that if 
people do not like this, if it is too tough on somebody, will they forum 
shop? Will they go elsewhere? 
Delaware upheld, in the Chevron38 case a few years ago, forum 
selection bylaws so that companies can adopt a bylaw and mandate that 
derivative and class litigation, fiduciary duty-based litigation, be 
litigated in Delaware. Over 1000 companies now have adopted them. 
But the concern remains, how do you prevent people from going 
elsewhere? Certainly, if you adopt a bylaw and you stick with it, then 
you can impose discipline. The good news here, from my perspective, as 
somebody who defends the honor of the State of Delaware in this 
enterprise, is that a lot of companies have adopted them, and that other 
jurisdictions have been respecting them—not all, but most. The most 
prominent one is a recent Oregon Supreme Court decision in the 
TriQuint case,39 which upheld the validity of a Delaware forum-
selection bylaw that was adopted in conjunction with the approval of a 
merger. It is the highest appellate court to do that. Good signs. 
The other sign is, I am hearing from practitioners that they are 
including in their merger agreements, not only the requirement that 
people adopt such a bylaw as part of their merger deal if they do not 
already have one, but that they also agree not to waive the bylaw. So, 
there is some mechanism being implemented to sort of keep everybody 
in the room so you can have the discipline that you need to have. Now, a 
caveat to that is you can always be mischievous. A forum-selection 
bylaw is optionality for a target. 
This is not a Delaware case, but there was a case that was called FX 
Energy,40 which was a Nevada corporation based in Utah that had a 
forum-selection clause selecting Utah. When it came to the point of 
litigation over a deal, the defendants ended up litigating the case in 
Nevada, notwithstanding the fact that the company picked a Utah forum, 
its home state, for a forum-selection bylaw. The defendants did that. 
Who knows why? But people like the broad release. It is a concern. It 
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 39. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 362 P.3d 328 (Or. 2015). 
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definitely can cause leakage on the ability to really enforce a different 
discipline. 
Let me go through the options in a little more detail about what 
Trulia is suggesting and why I think they are preferable. The 
preliminary injunction context is good old-fashioned litigation: one side 
will argue about why information is material; the other side will argue 
why it is not; and judges will do what they are supposed to do, they will 
call the balls and strikes, but they will do it with the information on the 
table, presented by both sides, marshalling all the case law. 
The defendants have the advantage of having their M&A advisors 
accessible to them so that they are particularly prepared, unlike a judge 
who would be reading a proxy statement for the first time, to know what 
matters or what does not matter. They can get to the heart of it much 
more effectively. 
There is a downside to this, because nobody wants their deal 
enjoined, but the downside is very narrow. The downside is that, for a 
very limited period of time, a deal can be enjoined so additional 
information can be disseminated. The downside is totally controlled by 
the defendants because they can always moot the dispute; they just 
supplement the proxy and issue the information and fight another day. 
That gets to mootness applications in terms of the fee context. 
Defendants always have that choice. They can just disseminate the 
information and then fight later about whether it was material or not, 
whether it is worthy of any sort of fee or not. When I say mootness, 
what I am talking about is you are pre-close: some initial proxy 
materials have gone out, and people add the additional information 
either in your definitive, final version of proxy, or in a separate 
supplement, an 8-K disclosure or something of that nature. The 
information goes out. 
In the mootness context, you get to a point where the plaintiffs say, 
“Well you know what? We may not have a release here, but that 
information conferred a benefit and we are entitled to a fee.” That is a 
mootness fee application. The defendants in that circumstance are 
incentivized to fight if they think the information is junk, so they do not 
have to pay a big fee. The adversarial process remains intact. 
When you take the release out of the equation, the defendants are 
untethered to any concern about the settlement going through and can 
just be focused on the quality of what was actually disclosed in terms of 
whether or not it is worth paying a fee for it. That, to me, is the key 
thing: that the adversarial process is back in place. For the court, it gives 
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us the flexibility that if somebody got a very marginal supplemental 
disclosure, they will not necessarily get a rich fee. It could be a zero fee 
if it had no value. That optionality remains. 
The other option is that you can do mootness deals, not just by 
coming to court and having the court determine whether a fee is 
appropriate for a mooted case when supplemental disclosures have been 
offered, but also privately. This goes back to a case about twenty years 
ago that Chancellor Allen decided, which sanctioned the use of this. But 
there is a caveat to this. It is basically a private agreement where a 
defendant is willing to pay a certain amount not to have to argue about a 
fee application any further, and it can be done outside of the court. So, 
the court is out of the decision-making, and critically, there is no release, 
so the release is out of the equation as well. 
The one thing we do require—and this comes way back from 
Chancellor Allen and is reflected in a number of decisions in the 
meantime—is disclosure to the shareholders of the paying entity, 
typically the acquiring company, which inherits the cost of the defense. 
We do that to avoid the risk of a buyoff so that there is some sunlight on 
the fact that money is being paid. Typically, I require it to be done in an 
8-K that discloses the amount, gives enough background about what the 
case was about, discloses the fee payment, and makes it explicitly clear 
that the court did not pass on the fee one way or the other. 
Is there concern about this? I think it works pretty well. There is 
always, ultimately, the ability for a stockholder to challenge that fee 
payment. It would probably be a tough case if it was truly an arm’s-
length decision, as I think most of them are. It would probably be a 
waste standard, a very tough claim to make, in order to challenge a 
company’s decision to pay a fee just to get rid of the litigation and put 
an end to the expense. There could be circumstances, I suppose, where 
somebody could say, “There is some egregious set of circumstances 
where self-interest was at play.” But I have not seen that kind of case 
yet. 
Let us go back to the settlement route and the traditional way of 
doing business, and examine how the rules I think have changed, or at 
least we are suggesting that they change. And that is, fundamentally, to 
be much more circumspect and rigorous on analyzing what you give up 
and what you get in the settlement. 
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On the “get” side of the disclosures, I articulated the standard of 
“plainly material.”41 It was not intended to make a new standard of 
materiality; it was really just intended to say, “It should be obvious that 
something is material.” The point is we are not going to go with just 
useful, or something marginal; the supplemental information is going to 
have to be something that under the traditional standards of materiality 
is “obviously material.” That is the bar. 
On the other side of the equation, because it is still a legitimate 
consideration, if you have actually conferred material information, 
which is a benefit, we are going to tighten up on the release. They are 
not going to be global in nature. The releases will be narrowed to 
basically two things: one is disclosures themselves, the real subject 
matter that was the basis for the consideration coming the other way; 
and, if the record is sufficiently developed, the fiduciary duty claims 
surrounding the deal itself, assuming you have a decent record that 
somebody kicked the tires and looked at the issues in a meaningful way. 
But it will not be a carte blanche release for any federal securities law 
claim or any antitrust claim or regulatory claim. It will be narrow and 
focused. 
Now, I do not know where this will go for sure but I can tell you 
what I have seen anecdotally. I have had one case since Trulia that came 
in because it was already in the pipeline with a supplemental disclosure, 
which I did approve because it did involve some material information 
and the release was crafted down to exactly what I suggested in Trulia. 
Almost invariably, what I have seen more often than anything else are 
the mootness applications. Typically, I will get a letter from a plaintiff’s 
lawyer saying, “Well, we have agreed with the other side to just present 
a fee application and dismiss our case with prejudice as to the named 
plaintiff and without prejudice as to the balance of the class.” That 
probably has happened for me in six cases already, and it is happening 
fairly routinely across the court at this point. 
So, the message of doing this in the mootness context seems to be 
occurring. This is only anecdotal. We will have to see with time. But 
that seems to be the direction. Those cases have started with, “Well we 
are going to dismiss our case, the substance and merits of the case. We 
will present the fee application.” And then, a month or two later, I will 
often get a letter saying, “We have worked out something with the 
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defendants on a fee. We do not need you at all.” Case over, no release; it 
is gone. 
You might say that this is a raw deal for defendants. The truth is 
most of this litigation, once it is dismissed, is never coming back. It is 
basically the end of the road for most deal-related challenges. And 
frankly, on the rare ones where it may actually have merit—the 
Rural/Metros of the world—there is something to be said for leaving 
that door open so those claims can be pursued in a legitimate post-
closing kind of way. 
I have not seen a lot of write-up yet in other jurisdictions about 
Trulia. In North Carolina, in the only case I know of that has cited 
Trulia, the judge there did not follow it. The reason that he could not 
was because, apparently, North Carolina does not have the corporate 
benefit doctrine and he did not think he could consider a fee on a 
mootness basis.42 There were some other wrinkles as well. I am not 
aware of other, at least published decisions or decisions available on 
Westlaw that have provided any insight yet. 
To sum up, I never in a million years, when I became a judge, 
thought this would be something I would be writing about. I never saw 
that coming. But it goes back to what I was saying at the beginning, 
which is you never know what is going to take up your time, and you 
never know when it will give you an opportunity to maybe change 
things. Maybe this will and maybe it will not. I hope, in at least some 
marginal way, it does change the practice for the better. 
I thank you for your attention. I would be glad to answer any 
questions. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It sounds like your focus is on the 
difficulty for the court in assessing settlements without an adversarial 
process and that you are inclined not to approve general releases without 
an adversarial process. Is there any reason why this structure is not 
applicable to other kinds of cases? 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: It could be. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The absence of an adversarial process is 
just as bad in fairness cases. 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: Yes. I talked a little bit about that. 
Here is the thing: if you have had a motion to dismiss, a summary 
judgment motion, some real litigation, you are more informed in making 
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that judgment. You do not always, but in many cases you do. Poring 
over the intricacies of those proxy statements is a particularly tough task 
for a judge to figure out. But yes, it is a problem in other cases. 
Interestingly enough, one of the things I talk about in Trulia is if we 
confronted it, we could appoint amici to take up the other side. In the old 
Chrysler v. Dann43 case, the predecessor of it, a very complicated case 
sorting out all sorts of very meaty claims, Chancellor Seitz appointed 
amici and they looked through those issues exhaustively, exactly for that 
reason. I mention in Trulia that we could even resort to doing that in the 
future. 
Part of this is intensely selfish when you put it that way. We do 
have to consider settlements all the time, and they are non-adversarial. 
But it is a little different here. If you take out the class and you just have 
two combatants going at it, you have replicated the adversarial process 
in that settlement, and that is one you are going to be very reluctant to 
disturb. It is the class that makes it difficult. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But the damages cases are also class 
cases. 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: They can be, certainly. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You talked about the forum bylaw being 
an example of a solution to corral things into Delaware. But I think the 
thinking in general is that it does not apply to federal claims. So, at least 
what I have been seeing is that some opportunistic plaintiff lawyers are 
now going to federal courts and filing federal securities claims. As you 
also said, the same materiality standard applies to both securities claims 
and the breach of fiduciary duty claims. And yet, now, for a release you 
can tentatively release price and process and breach of the duty of 
disclosures but you cannot release the federal securities claims. I was 
just curious as to what is the thinking behind that. 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: Federal courts are very good at 
applying federal securities laws and determining whether things are 
material or not, and what they decide to do on the back end will be up to 
them. If there is concern about the frequency of what was happening 
that was causing us concern, they can apply the same model in terms of 
what they are willing to approve on the back end. It will just be a 
decision they have to make. 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Has there not been an effort to pass a Rule 
1144 or a PSLRA45-type measure to ensure that if cases are brought, they 
have a meritorious basis? It sounds to me like all this tinkering with 
materiality is a very slippery slope, especially when you say that if 
something is in the public domain it cannot be ipso facto material—I 
disagree with that—but why is not there a Rule 11 process which comes 
out of all of this to police what is a small percentage of the Delaware bar 
that is bringing these voluminous cases one after another without any 
substance or ability to litigate? 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: Obviously, we do have Rule 11. It 
is also a pretty low bar to filing claims. There have been some 
incremental rule changes. We started making people verify complaints, 
asking for greater transparency in disclosure by plaintiffs and their 
holdings when we do class certification, and greater disclosure 
(particularly Vice Chancellor Laster in this area) about the plaintiff’s 
positions and their willingness—if they have a large position—not to 
sell during the duration of the case. 
Could more be done? Perhaps. But there has been a ratcheting up of 
those kinds of rules and those kinds of efforts. This does not lend itself 
to legislation because, ultimately, you are making a judicial judgment 
about whether a settlement is fair. Maybe there is a judicial resolution 
for that. But it is just not natural for a piece of legislation. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As you think about the reasons why this 
problem came up, one could point to greedy lawyers; one could point to 
a lot of different directions. It is just interesting, in terms of the solution 
that you came up with, that the bench is now just going to use “plainly 
material” instead of “material.” During the course of your comments 
you described how the bar was lowered to “helpful” or some other 
measure. Listening to your presentation, it is largely the bench fixing a 
problem that the bench created. I am just wondering what merit that 
has? 
CHANCELLOR BOUCHARD: Well, I guess time will tell. Early 
indications are that the number of these cases that are being filed is 
down dramatically. In the fourth quarter of 2015, the number was down 
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to 21% of deals being challenged.46 That is a staggering change from a 
year before. 
Now, I think the market is slow. I think deal buying, generally, is 
down. It is early. There was this pent-up series of cases, about seven or 
eight in about a two-year period, that rejected a settlement. So, the word 
was getting out even before Trulia was decided. It was just the cap to 
that. I think the long term will be defined by the volume of this kind of 
litigation and the frequency and whether the curve is bent on that. 
I cannot say much more about “plainly material.” I do not want to 
say much more about it. I put it out there. I thought long and hard about 
it. That was not an easy thing to do—you know, you are putting a stake 
in the ground. But I thought the message had to be that the game had 
changed and it was the most effective way I could communicate it. 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Will you join me in thanking the Chancellor? 
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